Abstract: Experimental one-way decoy quantum key distribution (QKD) is reported as a function of distance up to 25.3km. The high key rates obtained exceed one order of magnitude more than QKD performed without decoy pulse exchange.
Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a method which promises secure communication between two remote parties. (original proposal: BB84 [1] ). Single photon sources particularly suit the purpose for QKD as the single photon pulses are immune to the so-called pulse number splitting attack (PNS) on the quantum channel from an eavesdropper (Eve). However presently there is a lack of deterministic, reliable and useful single photon sources. Most implementations [2] rely on heavily attenuated lasers as a photon source which emit photons in a Poissonian manner. The PNS attack consists of blocking any true single photons in the quantum channel and removing part of the multi-photon pulses and transmitting them to Bob via a lossless channel. In this way, Bob's detection rate is maintained while Bob is oblivious to Eve's presence. Eve can then determine all or part of the key [3] .
A recent proposal [4] circumvents the PNS using additional (decoy) pulses sent by Alice so Bob can measure the transmittances of the quantum channel for different pulse intensities and detect PNS attacks. A very recent bidirectional decoy pulse system has been implemented [5] but a drawback of bi-directional systems are the pulse intensities can indeed be tampered with by Eve unknown to Alice and Bob, thus compromising security. Here we present a one-way single decoy pulse system which has an unconditionally secure continuous key rate of more than 15kbits per second (kbps) over 5km of fiber decreasing to more than 5kbps over 25.3km of fiber.
One-Way Single Decoy Pulse Quantum Key Distribution
The one-way fiber optic QKD system is drawn schematically in fig. 1(a) . Basis encoding is through phase modulation. Alice and Bob each have a Mach-Zehnder interferometer for encoding and decoding respectively. The laser pulses were produced at Alice using a distributed feedback laser operating at a wavelength of 1.55mm with a repetition rate of 8.333 MHz. Pulses of different intensities were realized by an accurate intensity modulator which is set to give the desired signal pulse to decoy pulse intensity ratio. The pulses are then strongly attenuated by an attenuator before leaving Alice. Alice and Bob were synchronized by multiplexing a 1.3mm clock laser with the quantum signals so that both clock and signal could be sent down the same fiber. Active stabilization ensured continuous operation [6] .
Two single photon Indium Gallium Arsenide avalanche photodiodes (APDs) were used as Bob's detectors. They were cooled to -30 o and had a combined dark count rate of ~10 -4 with negligible afterpulsing [7] . Bob's detection efficiency (including Bob's loss of 2.5dB) was characterized at 5.75·10 -2 . Custom electronics were developed for driving the QKD optics. For the distance of 25.3km we reduced the laser repetition rate of 7.143 MHz to reduce some slight Raman scattering of the light in the fiber.
The single pulse decoy plus the BB84 protocol was implemented [8] . Depending on the distance, various parameters were optimized using numerical simulation. In particular the signal intensity (photon number) was in the interval m =0.4-0.45 and the decoy pulse photon number n = 0.2-0.25 see fig. 1(b) . The fraction of decoy pulses to signal pulses was in the interval 0.75-0.94. The final secure bit rate, R is given by the following equation (which includes Cascade error correction [9] followed by privacy amplification [10] e is the upper bound on the single photon bit error rate [8] , sift N 1 is the lower bound on the of the number of sifted bits for the single photon pulses [8] . We include statistical fluctuations of the decoy pulse transmittance which gives a confidence interval of . The results of the final secure bit rate are presented in fig. 1 (c) . The key rate at small distances is over an order of magnitude greater than was obtained without a decoy method [11] (with quieter detectors); however as the transmission distance increases the key rate augments to over two orders of magnitude greater than that of the non-decoy [11] over 25.3km. The secure key generation rate was also simulated as function of distance for m =0.45,n = 0.21 ( fig. 1(c) inset) . As can be seen, high (>1kbps) secure bit rates over longer distances are possible; these distances are the subject of further experimental study.
Conclusion
To summarize, we have demonstrated practical, unconditional QKD over a series of fiber lengths up to 25.3km. The QKD system is resistant to PNS attacks as well as all other types of attacks. The secure key generation rates obtained are much higher than QKD systems not employing decoy pulses.
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